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STASIS AND CHANGE:  
RUSSIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN ANTI-HEGEMONIC WORLD ORDER 
Richard SAKWA 
Abstract 
This chapter argues that after a quarter century of stasis, the pattern of world order is changing 
and the inter-cold war period of the cold peace is giving way not to a thaw, but to the re-
entrenchment of bipolar confrontation between the expansive liberal international order and the 
resistance of a group of states including Russia. Like the First Cold War, the second is also 
about the conflicting views of world order as the U.S.-led liberal international order is 
challenged by the emergence of a putative anti-hegemonic alignment between Russia, China 
and their allies in the emerging alternative architecture of world affairs – especially the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa). The clash between Russia and the West, in this sense, is only an early version – and 
ultimately perhaps not the most significant – of the challenges against the long-term stasis in 
international affairs. Although the sinews of a post-Western world are emerging, it remains to 
be seen whether bodies like SCO and BRICS will be able to sustain the multilateralism of the 
last seven decades in the absence of the hegemon that had provided the security and support 
for such multilaterialism to thrive. 
Introduction 
After a quarter century of stasis, the pattern of world order is changing. The inter-cold war 
period of the cold peace is giving way not to a thaw, but to the re-entrenchment of bipolar 
confrontation. Like the First Cold War, the second is also about the conflicting views of world 
order, although the language and modalities differ. The U.S.-led liberal international order is 
challenged by the emergence of a putative anti-hegemonic alignment (Sakwa 2017). This 
phenomenon is much bigger than simply the re-emergence of China as a global actor or 
Russia’s neo-revisionist stance that challenges the practices of the previously hegemonic world 
order. Both countries defend the multilateral norms of the international system, but challenge 
the assumption that the liberal world order is synonymous with order itself. The two countries 
and to varying degrees their allies in the emerging alternative architecture of world affairs – 
notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa) – have also adopted elements of the neo-revisionist position, and this 
provides the ideational framework for the emerging anti-hegemonic world order.  
Members of this nascent alignment stress that it is not directed against anyone. The stated goal 
is to restore balance in world affairs within the framework not simply of multipolarity (although 
polycentrism, as Russians put it, is a key value), but through a positive agenda of a new model 
of international relations. The alignment is thus not “counter” hegemonic, which would simply 
replicate the existing pattern of international behaviour, but “anti” hegemonic, questioning the 
very idea that a single state and its allies can claim “primacy” in world affairs or that their 
ideology can be considered universal. This position was already implicitly asserted in 1945 in 
the Yalta system of great power relationships, but was then “democratised” through the 
principles enunciated in the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975. In the First Cold War, the U.S.-
led liberal international order was challenged by the Soviet bloc within the framework of a 
bipolar international order, but in the post-1989 period, the assertion of unipolarity undermined 
the principles of both Yalta and Helsinki (Ikenberry 2011). Today the aspirations for 
multipolarity are embedded in the broader emergence of two contesting visions of world order 
(Smith 2013). The confrontation between the expansive liberal international order and the 
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resistance of a group of states provoked the Second Cold War. The Trump phenomenon then 
emerged as an intervening variable, challenging both post-war representations of American 
hegemony and those who were coalescing in resistance to it. 
This chapter seeks to explore Russia’s perceptions regarding the emergence of an anti-
hegemonic world order at a time when the stasis in the international system is being replaced by 
dynamics of change. The first section discusses the end of stasis in the international system and 
how Russia responds to it – particularly in terms of its relations with the West. The second 
section elaborates on the factors shaping Russia’s distinct neo-revisionism which has emerged 
largely as a reaction to the absence of transformation of the European security system at the 
end of the Cold War. The third section focuses on the dynamics of change in the international 
system and the way Russia tries to redefine its relations with the West as well as other rising 
powers like China. 
The International System and the End of Stasis 
The emergence of a putative alternative model of world order promises to disrupt the long stasis 
in international affairs that predominated since 1945. Although 1989 brought important changes 
to the practice of international politics, the international system was not fundamentally 
transformed (Pouliot 2010). Equally, the current period of dynamic change is not intended by 
the key subaltern actors to revise the international system but only its practices. This is why 
Russia and China are not revisionist powers, but neo-revisionist: seeking to change how the 
existing works rather than changing the system itself. In the quarter century of the inter-Cold 
War years (1989-2014), otherwise known as the period of the cold peace, the liberal 
international order became more ambitious (within the framework of the ideology of 
globalisation and the “end of history”), but the post-1945 order prevailed. The main process 
after 1989 was the “enlargement” of the liberal order accompanied by extensive claims to 
hegemony. From that perspective, 1989 did not represent such a radical break, other than for the 
countries directly involved. Only after the expanding liberal order “hit reality” has some 
rethinking begun (Mearsheimer 2018).  
Only now, some 70 years after the end of the Second World War, is a major shift taking place 
in the international system. Acharya (2017) describes the new system as “multiplex”, while 
Flockhart (2016) describes the phenomenon as a “multi-order” world. The central point is not 
only that unipolarity has given way to multipolarity, but that the framework for relations 
between orders marks a qualitative change in international relations, and thus represents a 
return to the “transformative” agenda outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the First 
Cold War. The inter-Cold War period was characterised by tension between enlargement and 
transformation, but with the onset of the Second Cold War in 2014, the long period of stasis 
when the U.S.-led liberal order predominated (although challenged by the Soviet Union and 
its allies for some of the period) is now giving way to a renewed period of confrontation. 
While Gorbachev and his successors at the head of the Russian state sought a positive 
transformation within the framework of the post-Second War international system, the Second 
Cold War is characterised by a negative transformation in which the logic of confrontation 
has been restored.  
Stasis means more than simply stagnation, but it does suggest a certain inflexibility, immobility 
and absence of institutional or ideational innovation. It is in the latter sense that the term is used 
to describe the post-First Cold War security order in Europe. The foundations of that order were 
laid after 1945 in conditions of a developing bipolar confrontation between the Soviet bloc on 
the one hand and the U.S. and its allies on the other. This Atlantic system became the core of 
the global U.S.-led liberal international order. After 1989, this order – dubbed by Russian 
scholars the “Historical West” – began a process of enlargement to Eastern Europe, while at the 
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same time under the guise of “globalisation” it made claims to be universal. However, from the 
very beginning, Gorbachev, the Soviet leader who did the main work in bringing the Cold War 
to an end, believed that instead of enlargement being the governing process, the conduct of 
international relations should have been transformed to take advantage of the uniquely benign 
situation of the late 1980 and early 1990s. The idea was that the Soviet Union, and later Russia 
under its leader Boris Yeltsin, would engage with the Historical West as the co-founders of a 
new political community, what could putatively be called a “Greater West”. The deeper 
aspiration no doubt was to strip out the elements of American globalism (the power system) 
from globalisation (the convergence of world politics through economic and societal 
interactions). 
This would have required some institutional innovation and ideational creativity, but the project 
for a positive transcendence of the logic of conflict, Russian political leaders and academics 
continue to insist, was not only feasible but essential if the Cold War and confrontation were not 
to return to divide the continent. However, old-style globalism remained and in certain respects 
was reinforced. Russia refused to accept the role of junior partner in an already established 
enterprise, but sought to join that enterprise as an equal, believing thereby that the enterprise 
would be transformed by its membership. In other words, Russia’s assertion of its great power 
status did not entail the reassertion of some sort of imperial project, particularly in its 
neighbourhood, but sought to be institutionalised through the transformation of the traditional 
Atlantic community into a pan-European and indeed global community. This would have 
avoided the tension generated by the merger between democratisation and geopolitics that 
structured the cold peace and then generated the Second Cold War. The “democratic peace 
theory” in this period assumed that the enlargement of the sphere of liberal democracy would 
guarantee the security of the Atlantic system. It was thus assumed that joining NATO was the 
“democratic” thing to do, even if large sections of the relevant populations were opposed to the 
idea. 
Russia’s ideas for an alternative were only slowly formulated, and to this day lack substantive 
theoretical articulation. This is why Russia is sometimes seen as a “spoiler”: unwilling to accept 
what is posed as universal values, yet unable to formulate an intellectually and attractive 
alternative. Instead, the enlargement agenda, specifically in Europe but globally as well in the 
form of the agenda of the liberal international order became hegemonic. However, the 
contradictions in that order, above all the tension between its norms and power system in which 
it was embedded – the tension between democratisation and geopolitics (condemned by Russia 
as “double standards”) – in the end provoked a reaction which gave rise to an anti-hegemonic 
alignment. 
This is not an alliance let alone a bloc, but the alignment is gradually developing a more 
ramified institutional architecture, while at the same time, formulating a more coherent model 
of an alternative world order – all within the framework of the existing international system. 
The clash of orders is accompanied by contending models of international affairs. On the one 
side, realists assert that structural factors shape international politics, although there is no 
consensus about what the relevant structures are. Offensive realists stress the importance of 
anarchy as the primary condition, with international relations determined by the struggle for 
power and predominance by an international system populated by “billiard ball” states, in which 
domestic regimes and systems of governance are irrelevant (Mearsheimer 2014a). At the other 
extreme are constructivists, who argue that identities are shaped by mutual interaction between 
the “self” and “other” (Wendt 1992). Equally, realists are countered by the partisans of the 
“liberal world order” who assert that the rules-based system that has become predominant since 
1945, and reinforced by Western “victory” over the Soviet Union after the end of the First Cold 
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War in 1989, means that the traditional lexicon of great power politics, along with spheres of 
influence, balancing and bloc politics, have become anachronistic.  
In this conception, the democratic sphere is universal and assumes a monistic ideological and 
institutional character, whereas Gorbachev’s early proposal for a common European home, 
taken up by his successors in the form of the idea of “greater Europe”, assumes a pluralism of 
ideational and institutional forms. In other words, expansive globalism (although embedded in 
the putative universalism of globalisation) ran into the rocks of Sino-Russian particularism – 
although this particularism is embedded in a conservative form of internationalism. 
This only makes sense in the context of a credible understanding of the international system. 
Drawing on English School thinkers, I argue that the international system today is a 
fundamental hybrid, in which realist concerns about state sovereignty, security and autonomy 
predominate at the horizontal level in relations between states; but at the vertical level neo-
revisionist states such as Russia and China are committed to the institutions of multilateral 
governance (Sakwa 2017). Thus the international system has a binary structure. At the top there 
is the UN and the ramified “secondary institutions” (as termed by English School theorists) of 
international legal, economic, environmental and financial regulation. Although the autonomous 
power of these institutions should not be exaggerated, neither should they be dismissed. The 
UN remains the main source of legitimacy for international cooperative endeavours. At the 
lower level we have an increasing number of independent states, but their interactions have also 
evolved.  
The triumphant U.S. after the Second World War embedded its hegemony in the Atlantic 
alliance system, and on the global level advanced the multilateral and universal practices of the 
liberal world order. After the First Cold War, this multidimensional alliance system became the 
core of an enlarging “world order” with universalistic aspirations. One of the distinctive features 
of the Second Cold War is that the U.S. under President Donald J. Trump has emerged as a 
genuinely revisionist power, no longer ready to be constrained either by the liberal international 
order of which it was once the core, or by the structures of multilateral governance that it had 
done so much to foster in the years after 1945. At a time when the traditional liberal world order 
is beginning to unravel (although the extent of this should not be exaggerated), the alternative 
“anti-hegemonic” (or post-Western) world order is beginning to take shape, intended not to 
challenge the norms of the international system as they have developed since the Second World 
War, and codified in the institutions of global governance, but to question the hegemonic role of 
the states comprising the liberal world order. The challenge is to the practices of international 
affairs as conducted by the U.S. and its allies, and not the norms on which the international 
system today is governed. This is why Russia, China and their allies are neo-revisionist, and not 
out-and-out revisionist.  
For various reasons Russia was not incorporated into the “Historical West”, despite its earlier 
aspirations to join, and for more obvious reasons neither ultimately was China, although both 
took advantage of what the liberal world order had to offer. For status and a variety of historical 
and security reasons, neither could join the U.S.-led liberal international order as subaltern 
powers. Their fundamental argument is that the liberal world order is not synonymous with 
order itself. Washington and its allies represent one power system, and although this system has 
done much to advance the public goods associated with rules-based multilateral development, it 
also remains a particularistic system, despite its pretensions to universality. The “secondary 
institutions” of international society have now come to represent an autonomous level of 
universal order, based on principles and ideas that are far from the proprietary invention of the 
U.S.-led liberal international order (Dunne & Reut-Smith 2017). The ideas and principles 
underlying this universal order have long been debated in most civilisations, and although their 
normative formulation was greatly advanced after the Second World War, notably in the UN’s 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948, even this Declaration was 
formulated with the participation of all the major powers of the time. 
In this context, the fundamental cleavage in international politics today is between the partisans 
of the enlargement of the liberal international order (even if the baton of leadership may be 
passing from the U.S. to European states), and those who defend an anti-hegemonic view. The 
process of enlargement inevitability has an imperial element, if not conducted in a classically 
imperial manner (this is the fundamental source of “double standards” in international affairs). 
And imperial aggrandisement inevitably provokes a reaction. Russia, China and other powers 
are beginning to shape the lineaments of an alternative world order, based not on “anti-
Westernism” let alone opposition to “globalisation”, but for the defence of pluralism in the 
international system. Thus an anti-hegemonic alignment is gradually taking shape, with such 
institutions as the SCO, BRICS and other informal ties at its core. This is post-Western rather 
than anti-Western (Stuenkel 2016). It betokens the onset of Flockhart’s “multi-order” world and 
the multiplex arrangements described by Acharya. The nascent anti-hegemonic alignment 
defends not so much globalisation as the deepening integration of global markets and 
development strategies through intensified internationalism, in which states retain the power to 
shape their industrial strategies and social policies, and to resist the supra-nationalism of 
investor-state adjudication mechanisms. Because of the continued vertical commitment to 
multilateral institutions of global governance, this is more than a reversion to traditional 
Westphalian internationalism. Classic definitions of globalisation were understood to represent 
an ideological project for the enlargement of a specific model of economic relations, with U.S. 
power at its core (Panarin 1998), whereas the anti-hegemonism of the rising powers insists on a 
modified model of multilateral globalism. 
Russia and Neo-revisionism 
How does Russia fit into all of this? At the end of the Cold War Russia advanced a programme 
to transform the European security system, and by implication, the pattern of global politics 
entrenched in Cold War institutions and ideologies. Gorbachev talked of a “common European 
home”, which fitted into the classic Gaullist discourse of “Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals” and François Mitterrand’s idea of a “confederation of Europe”. Moscow insisted that it 
was the instigator of the end of the Cold War, and had thus won the right to be the co-author of 
a transformed post-Cold War world. With Russia’s inclusion, the “Historical West” would 
become a “Greater West”, and the structures of the Cold War would be dismantled as a 
common developmental programme was devised. Fearing normative dilution, institutional 
incoherence and, perhaps above all, the weakening of American leadership (globalism), this 
programme of radical transformation was rejected in favour of an enlargement agenda of the 
existing structures, those that had apparently achieved “victory” over the Soviet Union.  
Wohlforth and Zubok (2017, 416) argue that “There were no easy ‘missed opportunities’ to 
integrate the USSR or post-Soviet Russia seamlessly into the West. To have achieved that 
outcome would have taken statesmanship of the sort rarely if ever witnessed in international 
politics.” Equally, there was not much, in their view, that Russia could have done to avoid the 
effects of disintegration and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. There was, they rightly argue, no 
“vast conspiracy” to keep the country down, and instead “Russia is not an abiding 
preoccupation but rather an inconvenience for the West, which has strong reasons not to put its 
core approach to security at risk to accommodate Moscow.” This is true as far as it goes, but 
neglects the quite practical ideas put forward by the Soviet leadership at the time that provided a 
route out of Europe’s endemic conflicts. In other words, their argument makes sense as seen 
from Washington, but not from the continental European capitals. The failure to seize the 
opportunity to build a pan-European peace order gave rise to the 25 years of the cold peace, 
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provoking in the end the Second Cold War. In other words, no exceptional statesmanship was 
required, but just openness to exploit an opportunity to bring Russia and its neighbours into an 
inclusive and indivisible security system, thus precluding the onset of an intensifying security 
dilemma that provoked the 2008 Georgian war and the 2014 Ukraine conflict. While the 
Congress of Vienna quickly found a way to incorporate defeated France into the post-war order, 
the Treaty of Versailles failed to do so for Germany and thus contributed to creating the 
conditions for the Second World War (Kissinger 2014). The post-1991 settlement has elements 
of the second approach, although couched in the language of friendship and support, and thus 
after a “25 years’ crisis” (Sakwa 2008) the First Cold War gave way to the Second.  
Given that the Soviet system had dissolved and the country disintegrated, the victory discourse 
seemed plausible. However, politics of transformation is something that Russia would not give 
up so easily, along with those aligned with it outside of the liberal world order, and even within. 
As the radicalism of Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn suggests, the programme of 
transformation has deep roots in the heartlands of the liberal international order, accompanied 
by resurgent peace and non-aligned movements worried by the renewed drift towards 
militarism and confrontation. New political thinking is not a purely Russian phenomenon. The 
transformation agenda in international politics is accompanied by the desire for change 
domestically. The two are connected, and the frozen character in international relations 
intensified certain governing practices that introduced policy stasis into domestic politics, which 
in the end exploded in a wave of populist nationalism. It is hardly surprising that the right and 
left “populism” of today is provoked by hostility to what are perceived as global elites 
concerned only with the mobility of capital, labour, goods and services, while neglecting the 
concerns of domestic populations, who increasingly perceive themselves as the victims of 
globalisation. Post-First Cold War elites failed in addition to create a viable European security 
order, provoking the Second Cold War.  
While 1989 may well have been a “masterpiece of history” (Savranskaya, Blanton & Zubok 
2010), the absence of institutional and ideational innovation at the end of the Cold War is 
striking. Everything in Russia’s history militated against it becoming simply a subordinate 
element of an expanding “Historical West”. At first, Russia sought to devise a fundamental 
partnership with the enlarging EU, but even that faltered by the mid-2000s, as a wave of 
traditionally anti-Russian post-communist countries joined (Maas 2016; Forsberg & Haukkala 
2016). Even more disruptive was NATO enlargement, something that realists, such as George 
Kennan, warned would ultimately provoke a Russian counter-reaction. Equally portentous was 
the way that the enlargement agenda incorporated the structures of the Cold War into the 
expanding system. Although there was no deliberate attempt to exclude Russia, institutions such 
as the NATO-Russia Council were clearly devised within the framework of mitigation rather 
than transformational strategies. The structural condition of the cold peace was the merger of 
democratisation and geopolitical agendas in the expanding West, in which normative concerns 
fused with the enlargement of the Atlantic security system. The result was “trans-democracy”, 
based theoretically on liberal peace theory, but with enormous practical consequences (Sakwa 
2017, 98-104).  
As far as Russia was concerned, the 25 years of the cold peace failed to resolve any of the 
fundamental problems of European and global security. For Russia, NATO enlargement 
represented not only a betrayal of the verbal assurances apparently given at the time of 
German unification that the alliance would not move “one inch to the East” of the former East 
German territory (Savranskaya & Blanton 2017), but represented a provocation that only 
intensified the security dilemma that the alliance was intended to avert. At the end of the Cold 
War, Russia was offered associate membership of an existing enterprise, the “Historic West”, 
but Russia’s enduring aspiration was to become a founder member of a transformed “Greater 
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West”. Membership of the transformed community would have provided a benign framework 
for Russia’s domestic transformation, while removing the institutional and ideational 
structures of the Cold War. By contrast, joining an untransformed “Historic West” entailed 
status demotion, since it would have been a subaltern element in a U.S.-dominated system 
(Larson & Shevchenko 2003). Even under Yeltsin in the 1990s this was hard to swallow, and 
under Putin in the 2000s there were attempts to find a new balance between Russian 
adaptation and foreign policy and developmental autonomy. By the time Putin returned to 
presidency in 2012 for his third term, Russia had shifted to a policy of neo-revisionism: 
maintaining a commitment to the norms of international society, but resisting the practices of 
U.S. primacy and globalism.  
Neo-revisionism is the product of frustration that none of the three earlier phases of post-
communist Russian foreign policy had delivered the anticipated benefits. In the first phase, 
that of liberal internationalism accompanied by a nascent Atlanticism to temper Russia’s 
traditional Eurocentric continentalism, all sides believed that a new international community 
could be established. It soon became clear that the West and Russia had very different ideas 
of how this could be achieved, with Russia still insisting on elements of transformation and 
co-constitution, and the West beginning the process of enlargement that would see NATO and 
the EU expand to Russia’s borders. This helped provoke the second stage, the era of 
competitive coexistence, from the mid-1990s under the leadership of Yevgeny Primakov, first 
as foreign minister from January 1996 to September 1998, and thereafter as prime minister to 
May 1999.  Policy shifted away from what was condemned as uncritical Atlanticism towards 
multipolarity, strategic competition with the West, and the emphasis on what at the time was 
called the RIC (Russia, India, China) combination. This did not preclude cooperation, but the 
nascent post-communist ideology of anti-hegemonism was now clearly articulated at the 
highest levels of Russian policy-making. 
On coming to power in 2000, Putin inaugurated the third phase – the policy of new realism – 
which tried to find a new framework for relations with the expanding West. It was realist to 
the degree that Putin defended elements of traditional Westphalian sovereignty, but it was 
new because it remained committed to the fundamental precepts of Gorbachev’s “New 
Political Thinking” of the perestroika years, and sought to find new ways of overcoming the 
contradictions of the cold peace. Contrary to the standard image of Putin, he tried to find a 
“third way” in which Russia could integrate into the liberal international order while 
maintaining its strategic autonomy. In the end, no such formula could be found, precipitating 
the slide into neo-revisionism, which became the dominant paradigm of Russian foreign 
policy on Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. Putin was thoroughly disillusioned and 
disappointed in the West, especially after the intervention in Libya in 2011, and now sought 
to accelerate integrative endeavours in the post-Soviet space accompanied by the 
development of deeper ties with China. All this preceded the Ukraine crisis while at the same 
time helping shape Russia’s response to that crisis following the overthrow of Viktor 
Yanukovych in February 2014. In other words, well before the onset of the Second Cold War 
in 2014, Putin had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to deal with the “Historical 
West”, and accelerated moves towards Eurasian integration, the “pivot to the East”, and 
insulating the Russian economy from dependence on the West.  
Russia’s neo-revisionism is a response to the dilemmas provoked by the absence of 
transformation of the European security system at the end of the Cold War. Wohlforth and 
Zubok (2017) rightly stress the impediments to such a transformation, but fail to take into 
account the specifically European context of the transformation. In global terms their realist 
paradigm is convincing, but the dynamics in Europe were potentially different. It is here that 
the normative impetus for transformation was highest, including domestic constituencies, as 
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well as the institutional framework for a specific European international society, instantiated 
not only in the EU but also in the Council of Europe (CoE) and Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). There were powerful countervailing trends, notably the U.S.-
dominated security system that was extrinsic to the transformative processes on the continent. 
The potential was there. After all, the EU would not exist were it not for the desire for a new 
type of peace order after the devastation of the Second World War. It did indeed take some 
visionary leadership to make it a reality, but mostly it emerged out of a recognition of mutual 
necessity (Milward 2000). However, the EU from the beginning was part of an Atlantic 
system, and after the Cold War it became the spearhead for the enlargement of that system 
(Mearsheimer 2014b).  
On the other side, Russia since the end of the Cold War has been engaged in what Suzuki 
calls the “recognition game”, the attempt by “frustrated great powers” to convince their peers 
that they are worthy members of the international system. It is important, as Suzuki argues, to 
understand the intentions of these putative great powers. Rather than subverting the norms of 
international society, Russia has in fact, along with China, been strengthening the normative 
structures of international society as they seek to gain legitimation for their desired status 
(Suzuki 2008). Thus, Russia has repeatedly called for the UN to remain the only legitimate 
arbiter for international interventions, and China has stepped in to defend the rules-based 
globalised economic order against Trumpian protectionism. However, because of the structure 
of hegemonic power in the international system, expressed above all in America’s intention to 
maintain primacy, there is no path towards acceptance as a legitimate peer. This is why both 
Russia and China have moved towards the stance of neo-revisionism in which they no longer 
believe that it is in the gift of the hegemonic power to grant or withhold their respective status 
as great powers. 
The realist paradigm considers Russia as no more and no less than a normal power, pursuing a 
rational (although that does not mean uncontested) foreign policy to maintain its position in 
the world and its neighbourhood. In that context, Moscow welcomed the conciliatory 
comments from Trump that it made sense to “get along” with Russia, and to that degree 
Moscow saw Trump’s election in November 2016 as an opportunity genuinely to “reset” the 
relationship based on mutual respect for the interests of the other. Although Trump was 
committed to the maintenance of U.S. primacy (as evidenced in the sharp rise in defence 
spending), this would be achieved less through the multilateralism of the Obama-style 
“leadership” agenda, and instead a more muscular nationalism would be expressed through 
the assertion of “greatness” and transactional relations between the great powers. Geopolitics 
would be decoupled from democratisation. In other words, the plan was to normalise U.S. 
globalism and to decouple it from messianic ambitions to reshape the world in America’s 
image. This suited Russia just fine. It meant the end of the “enlargement” agenda, in which 
democratisation was mixed with geopolitical concerns. Democracy promotion was curtailed 
and regime change was declared no longer on the agenda, much to the chagrin of those who 
considered Russia an “autocracy” (Carothers & Brown 2018). However, it offered little in the 
way of system transformation of the sort desired by Russia, and to that degree Trump for 
Moscow represented little more than the opportunity for a more transactional relationship. 
In the event, “Russiagate” served to constrain Trump’s freedom of manoeuvre, and a more 
traditional U.S. foreign policy was reasserted. Even modest moves towards a more pragmatic 
relationship were stymied, although there was some cooperation on the ground in Syria and 
other global issues. The big picture was one of a continued impasse in Russia’s relations with 
the West. Angela Merkel’s re-election in Germany in September 2017 meant that the fragile 
status quo looked to be maintained in Europe, with the constant danger of a sharp 
deterioration. The post-Cold War attempt to maintain the Atlantic system and blunt the 
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emergence of a more pluralistic international system looked set to continue, and with it the 
neo-containment policy. The U.S. sanctions are unlikely to be rescinded any time soon, and 
with Merkel’s election the EU-sponsored ones look set to endure. However, history suggests 
that stasis in the international system generates disorder. The new inter-order balance between 
the U.S.-led liberal international order (although threatened from within by a potential U.S. 
defection) and the nascent anti-hegemonic alignment became constitutive of international 
relations. The Second Cold War may well endure as long as the first. Thus, the scene is set for 
prolonged confrontation and conflict, mitigated only by the UN and other secondary 
institutions of international society. 
The Dynamics of Change 
The West sees in Russia a heuristic image of itself, when in fact Russia has broken out of the 
traditional hermeneutics of European international relations. The starkest manifestation of this is 
the intensification of the continuing “pivot to the East”, and in particular the close alignment 
with China accompanied by the strengthening of a “post-Western” world order encompassing 
such bodies as the SCO and BRICS, the heart of what is emerging as an anti-hegemonic 
alignment. Even Europe is shaken by the new dynamic of change, undermining the stasis in its 
affairs. The Atlantic enlargement strategy did not represent the resolution of the European 
security dilemma but the intensification of that problem. Relations between Russia and Europe, 
and with the West more generally, entered a deep impasse.  The resolution of the problem it 
appeared could not be found from within the hermeneutics of the system itself, in which the 
liberal international order is faced by a number of rising powers loosely aligned in an anti-
hegemonic bloc. There is a clash of orders, but at the same time some profound changes are 
taking place in international relations. In the framework of my two-level model of the 
international system, there are changes in the vertical axis – relations between states and orders 
and the institutions of global governance, above all the UN; and at the horizontal level, where 
the universalistic ambitions of the liberal international order are challenged by the emergence of 
the anti-hegemonic alignment as well as by non-systemic forces that seek to destroy the entirety 
of the international system to create, in particular, a new militant form of the Islamic ummah. 
The clash between Russia and the West is only an early version, and ultimately perhaps not the 
most significant, of the challenges now challenging the long-term stasis in international affairs. 
International relations are now being reshaped, above all by the putative defection of the U.S. 
from the core of the liberal international order that it has so assiduously developed over the last 
70 years. Many of the themes sounded by Trump were advanced in one form or another by 
American leaders before him, but none with such intensity or generated by ideas that are so 
fundamentally at odds with the multilateral normative Atlanticism that took shape after 1945. 
Trump is the consummate national realist, having little respect for international institutions or 
multilateral processes. By contrast, Russia’s continuing commitment to international society as 
expressed in the UN and other “secondary institutions” means that Putin is a “conservative 
institutionalist”, defending international law and the traditional rules of global governance (the 
intervention in Ukraine in 2014 was a revisionist act, but not part of a revisionist strategy). By 
contrast, after 1989 “democratic institutionalists” sought to use international society to “remedy 
drawbacks of traditional international law and develop new institutions by using the rule of the 
majority in roughly the same way it works in domestic politics” (Sokov 2018). There has long 
been a national realist strain in U.S. foreign policy, and it was this tendency which defeated 
Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to create a multilateral world order in the wake of the First World 
War, and which kept the U.S. out of the League of Nations. Although Putin’s policy is 
pragmatic and broadly realist, it is not realist in the strict definition of the term because of its 
willingness to share sovereignty with international institutions (notably the UN, CoE and 
WTO), irrespective of its chequered relations with these bodies.  
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At the same time, Russia challenges the attempt by democracy promotion activists and others to 
extend the scope of global governance bodies to disrupt the balance between sharing and 
maintaining sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) mechanism adopted in 2005 
alarmed Russia and other states who considered it as an unwonted increase in the power of an 
international community dominated by the hegemonic powers, although in practice Russia 
engaged with R2P, despite the conservatism of its institutionalism (Averre & Davies 2015). In 
the inter-Cold War years the main tension between Russia and the U.S. was between the two 
forms of institutionalism, although both camps evolved under different leaders. Even though 
Putin pursued a “new realist” policy, this represented an attempt to find some mode of 
integration and reconciliation with the democratic institutionalist agenda, but in the end this was 
doomed to fail. Nevertheless, even as neo-revisionism came to predominate in Russian foreign 
policy, this did not make Putin a realist of the old school. It is for this reason “any cooperation 
between them [Putin and Trump] can only be temporary and tactical.” For Trump power is the 
key asset, deployed as finite asset, in a context where the balance of power is perceived to be 
moving away from the U.S. (Sokov 2018). Hence Trump insists that allies contribute more to 
their own defence, a long-term stance of U.S. leaders but now couched in terms of a 
transactional relationship rather than the traditional common commitment to multilateral 
institutions. It is in this light that Trump while campaigning in 2016 argued that NATO was 
“obsolete”, and in power he made little effort to hide his distaste for the EU. He appeared to 
make NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee dependent on whether a state met the 2% defence 
spending target set in Wales in September 2014. This represents a shift from collective to 
transactional defence, where security guarantees apply only if the appropriate contribution has 
been made. 
Trump’s approach to Russia is in line with his national realist view of international relations. He 
consistently stressed the importance of good relations with Russia (provoking the fears of the 
defenders of the traditional order in Washington), and pushed for the Helsinki summit with 
Putin in July 2018. However, this did not prevent him from taking numerous measures against 
Russia, including the sale of lethal arms to Ukraine, ramping up funding for the European 
Reassurance Initiative and reinforcing the U.S. troop presence in Europe, condemning the 
building of Nord Stream 2 as making Germany subservient to Russia, imposing harsh sanctions, 
expelling Russian diplomats and closing down Russian diplomatic facilities in the U.S. His 
overall strategy was in the Henry Kissinger mode (and he appears to have been advised by 
Kissinger), namely to try to recruit Russia to align with the U.S. against what was perceived as 
the greatest long-term threat, China. In practice, the sum of U.S. actions only reinforced the 
Russo-Chinese alignment, and there was zero chance of Russia defecting. At the best of times, 
the two countries saw the U.S. as an unreliable protagonist, and although there are plenty of 
voices in Moscow warning of the dangers of a too-close embrace with China, their alignment is 
far more than one built on the truly extraordinary relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping. 
The two share not only a strong personal relationship, but also the conservative institutionalist 
position. Thus Russia condemned Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA, Iran nuclear deal) in May 2018 while emphasising the crucial role of the UN, 
while China emerged as the great defender of open markets and global economic governance. 
The struggle for recognition as an equal in the management of international affairs is now a 
more credible proposition, as evidenced in Russia’s remarkably effective intervention in Syria 
from September 2015 (even though the end game of the Syrian civil war may entail intensified 
great power conflict). At the tenth BRICS summit, held in South Africa in July 2018, Putin 
noted that the group had developed into “a full-scale organisation with new spheres of activity 
and broader common interests.” The main topics discussed were “resistance to unilateral 
approaches in global affairs, the protection of multilateralism,” and the condemnation of 
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economic sanctions and the use of force in violation of the UN Charter (Kremlin.ru 2018). 
BRICS established its New Development Bank in July 2014, based in Shanghai but with plans 
to open regional branches in all the BRICS members. At that time the BRICS accounted for 
26.5 of the world’s land area, 42.6 per cent of world population, and according to the IMF in 
2015 generated almost a quarter of the world’s GDP and contributed more than half of global 
economic growth in the previous decade (RT 2018). George Toloraya (2018), executive director 
of the Russian National Committee on BRICS research, argued that “BRICS is about world 
order,” creating its own structure of global governance “to create a world order that will be 
more just and balanced than what we see now.” 
Russia and China are not the harbingers of a new nationalism but of a new internationalism. 
Both insist on the equal status of all countries under international law. Under the flag of this 
principle they contested the slide towards democratic majoritarian rule in international politics, 
and thus opposed humanitarian intervention unless sanctioned by the UN Security Council. 
They opposed attempts by the West to impose rules through majority decisions or the use of 
multilateral institutions for political purposes. This was the case when in July 2018 the majority 
of members of the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) voted on the 
right to draw on outside expertise to assign responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, 
which Russia argued gave it a political role that it feared could be used by the West to pursue 
broader unrelated political goals. Moscow’s concern at the perceived politicisation of the 
organisation opened up the possibility that Russia could even leave the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 
Overall, if the 20th century was the century of ideology, then the 21st in its Trumpian version is 
beginning to look rather more like the 19th, i.e. nationalistic and mercantilist. For the 
commentators who in 2014 condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine as a throwback to 19th 
century, this would confirm a natural convergence between Putinite Russia and Trumpian 
America. However, this would be wrong for the reasons outlined above. Paradoxically, it is now 
Russia and China who are defending multilateralism and the governance institutions of 
international society. Both defend the traditional view of state sovereignty, but as noted this 
does not represent a simple reversion to Westphalian internationalism. Their conservative 
institutionalism is ranged as much against the Trumpian sovereignty discourse as it is against 
the expansive interventionism of the democratic institutionalists. 
One of the more striking manifestations of the shift from stasis to change is that the very 
concept of “the West” is being challenged. It is not that Russia is looking to the East to build 
alliances with other illiberal states, the way that recent developments are categorised by 
defenders of the old liberal hegemony, but an expression of the changing realities of global 
politics. The West is no longer the centre of the world in economic and even normative terms. 
Values of good governance, defensible property rights, rule of law, free and fair elections 
remain embedded as the core values of international society, although tempered by 
developmental and security considerations in countries like Russia and China. In fact, if 
decoupled from the Western power system and its inexorably hegemonic demands, there is a 
greater chance for them to be achieved. NATO enlargement effectively militarised the 
democracy promotion efforts of the West, while unmediated EU enlargement and power 
projection into the contested “common neighbourhood” reinforced the view of critics in 
Moscow that “democratic institutionalism” represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s 
security and national interests (Hahn 2018).  
Not surprisingly, some Russian analysts take great glee in describing the travails of the 
disintegrating West. In their view, Trump’s policy called into question the common interests 
and common values of some of the fundamental institutions of the old order. The G7 summit in 
Taormina, Italy, in May 2017 was considered a failure, while the one in La Malbaie, Canada, in 
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June 2018 proved a veritable disaster. Trump’s application of the transactional business model 
to his allies raised the question of whether the West would survive in its traditional form at all. 
This would provide an opportunity for the anti-hegemonic alignment to assume a greater share 
of the burden of global leadership, but only if the end of stasis in international affairs was 
accompanied by the positive transcendence of immobilism. However, just as after the end of the 
First Cold War, a negative transcendence is possible, intensifying the conflicts and deepening 
the Second Cold War. The inertia associated with the post-war stasis has deep roots, but its 
unravelling can have both positive and negative outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Is an alternative possible? Some years ago Andrew Hurrell (2006, 1) noted that the four BRIC 
countries had a certain “capacity to contribute to the production of international order, 
regionally or globally.” At that time Russia was considered the outlier, since “the reality of the 
past two decades here has been one of decline and the dissolution of power” (Hurrell 2006, 2; 
MacFarlane 2006). Hurrell (2006, 2) noted that while a central theme of the 20th century was 
the struggle of revisionist states to achieve equal rights, “the recognition of regional spheres of 
influence, and the drive for equality of status within formal and informal international 
institutions,” and although in the recent period “the currency of power” may have changed, the 
issue of recognition “has been sharpened by the growth of the idea that international society 
should aim to promote shared values and purposes rather than simply underpin coexistence and 
help to keep conflict to a minimum.” In the second decade of the 21st century, Russia re-
emerged as an active player in international affairs, and although still only barely in the top 
dozen countries economically, its impressive military reform and re-equipment since the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war allowed it to “punch above its weight”. Stasis and change now balance 
each other, and although the post-First Cold War order is unravelling, this has given rise to both 
a Second Cold War and the emergence of an anti-hegemonic alignment. The question today is 
whether the latter can help transcend the former. 
Although the sinews of a post-Western world are emerging, notably in the form of SCO and 
BRICS, it remains to be seen whether these bodies and countries behind them will be able to 
sustain the multilateralism of the last seven decades in the absence of the hegemon that had 
provided the security and support for such multilateralism to thrive. The post-Western world 
may well assume the characteristics of the pre-Western international system, dominated by 
vast competing empires. Nevertheless, Trumpian realism entails partial de-globalisation, and 
it would be the supreme irony if liberal internationalism and open markets were to be saved 
by the leaders of the anti-hegemonic alignment. This could herald a new age of post-
hegemonic internationalism, but it could equally inaugurate a new era of zero-sum conflict, 
protectionism, a drive to the bottom in regulatory standards and another three-decade-long 
Cold War. 
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